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Abstract 
Policymaking is increasingly being informed by 'big data' technologies of 
analytics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence (AI). John Rawls used 
particular principles of reasoning in his 1971 book A Theory of Justice which 
might help explore known problems of data bias, unfairness, accountability 
and privacy, in relation to applications of machine learning and AI in 
government. This paper will investigate how the current assortment of UK 
governmental policy and regulatory developments around AI in the public 
sector could be said to meet, or not meet, these Rawlsian principles, and what 
we might do better by incorporating them when we respond legislatively to this 
ongoing challenge. This paper uses a case study of data analytics and 
machine learning regulation as the central means of this exploration of 
Rawlsian thinking in relation to the re-development of algorithmic governance. 
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[A] INTRODUCTION 
The difficulty in regulating 'algorithmic justice' according to clear human rights 
standards forms the issue under discussion in this paper.  It uses the legal and moral 
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philosophy of John Rawls to re-investigate the need for a purposive approach to 
regulating algorithmically-assisted decision-making in government, and to regulate 
that 'algorithmic governance' according to certain Rawlsian principles with regard to 
equality, liberty and distributive justice. Jennifer Cobbe, amongst a wide range of 
authors, has recently highlighted that '[m]achine learning systems are known to have 
various issues relating to bias, unfairness, and discrimination in outputs and 
decisions, as well as to transparency, explainability, and accountability in terms of 
oversight, and to data protection, privacy, and other human rights issues', but also 
that 'the processes and metrics for fair, accountable, and transparent machine 
learning developed through … research do not always translate easily to legal 
frameworks' (Cobbe 2018: 4-5). We argue that Rawlsian principles can guide this 
process of marrying data science approaches to fairness for machine learning and AI 
to the development of new legal frameworks.  
In the words of Alistair Duff (2006: 17), 'The ideas of philosopher John Rawls 
should be appropriated for the information age.' John Rawls, in his 1971 book A 
Theory of Justice, set out the idea that from behind a 'veil of ignorance', in an 
'original position', a human policy maker with no conception of the disparities and 
inequalities in power, wealth or privilege that come about through the realities of 
class, race and geopolitics, would contract with other policymakers, also in a 
similarly ignorant position, to ensure a system of fair and liberal rules to benefit all 
(Rawls 1999: 11). Duff (2006: 21) argues that for 'neo-Rawlsians, therefore, the 
response to the digital divide, as to any other inequality, will be to regulate social and 
economic institutions, including information institutions, so that differentials 
demonstrably work for the good of all, and especially the worst off.'  
Rawls used two principles of reasoning to set out and encapsulate this theory 
of justice. In 'The Original Position', an essay by Ronald Dworkin, Rawls' critic 
explained this pair of principles. Firstly, 'every person must have the largest political 
liberty compatible with a like liberty for all' (Dworkin 1975: 17). First we should note 
that inequality and discrimination are not new issues brought about by AI. They 
occur all the time, whenever we are not in the original position. And machines, like 
humans discriminate. Of course, we might accept that not everybody will be subject 
to governance or AI governance equally. But decisions should be easy to scrutinize. 
For Rawls liberty, and equality of challenge, is a public good that should be available 
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to all. This results in an imperative to create the accessible avenues required for 
scrutiny, and to enable civilians to challenge those that govern them.  Everybody 
would like to think that if they were unfairly, in their view, 'profiled' by a human or by 
AI, then it would be easy to challenge the resulting decision. Even if AI was only 
being used as a tool to advise the subsequent decision of a human it should be easy 
to understand the steps the AI has taken to reach its output. Members of the public 
must be able to hold those that govern them to account, this includes the algorithms 
informing their decisions.    
 
Additionally, Dworkin explains, Rawls develops a second principle that 
'inequalities in power, wealth, income and other resources must not exist except in 
so far as they work to the absolute benefit of the worst-off members of society' 
(Dworkin 197: 17). This second principle translates into an imperative that 'big data' 
technologies used to assist decision-making must be used in such a way that they 
do not re-entrench inequality in power, wealth, income and other resources i.e. that 
they work to the absolute benefit of the worst-off members of society. 
 
Policymaking is increasingly being informed by 'big data' technologies of 
analytics, machine learning, and AI. But the application of data science through a 
general legal framework on data protection (which in the UK differentiates mainly 
along the lines of law enforcement versus non-law enforcement uses of data), non-
binding professional codes of ethics and a body of human rights law that is catching 
up with the developing practice of data-informed governance. To deliver a sense of 
the variety and scope of the challenge of regulating the use of data science in 
government, in its next two sections this paper presents a case study highlighting the 
issues with 'algorithmic justice' in policing contexts. First it is appropriate to give an 
overview of the common problems of 'algorithmic justice in government'. 
 
Grace (2019) has previously tried to develop a theoretical account of how the 
use of machine learning and AI within government, in both policymaking and in the 
application of policy, could raise concerns over 'algorithmic impropriety'. As Grace 
(2019) has highlighted, strands of algorithmic impropriety can include 'decisional 
opacity', leading to an inability to effectively challenge the results of algorithmic 
justice; 'data inequality', resulting in the embeddedness of inequalities, and arising 
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from unfairly skewed data sets; and 'accuracy bias', resulting from a risk-averse, and 
predominantly public protection-oriented approach to defining accuracy in predictions 
and algorithmic profiling. This piece now looks at these issues using a case study of 
data analytics in policing, drawing on an approach taken by other studies - notably 
the ground-breaking piece by Selbst (2017). 
 
 
[B] AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM—AND A CASE STUDY 
OF DATA ANALYTICS IN POLICING 
People will not experience justice evenly, and algorithmic justice is no exception. 
There is a risk that algorithms entrench existing inequalities. Those who are more 
reliant on state welfare hand-outs, or who are the object of criminal investigations, 
are a cost that will be, increasingly over time, algorithmically ranked and assessed 
for risks posed to the public purse, or to public protection. A Rawlsian approach 
would demand a high degree of information in the public domain, enabling 
individuals to challenge decisions on a range of grounds. Assessing a system from 
the 'original position', requires that  citizens be well equipped with the knowledge 
needed to take on the state if they felt they were subject to informational 
discrimination. A lack of transparency over the algorithms used to govern us is an 
innate threat to our equal system of liberties for all. 
We can see a recent (and so far rare) example of a successful challenge to a 
lack of transparency in algorithmic justice in the Systemic Risk Indication (SyRI) 
judgment from the first instance Hague Divisional Court in the Netherlands. In 
Netherlands Committee of Jurists for Human Rights v State of the Netherlands 
(2020) there were findings on transparency failures in relation to an algorithmically-
assisted benefit fraud prediction tool. Given the importance of proportionality in 
interferences with the right to respect for private and family life, and the requirement 
of a 'fair balance' between that right and the public interest in the investigation of 
benefit fraud, there were problematic shortfalls in transparency over the extent to 
which members of the public subject to risk reports under the SyRI process were 
aware of this, or could challenge their profiling as likely fraudsters or otherwise. 
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In the SyRI judgment, the Hague Divisional Court found (para. 6.49) that the 
Netherlands authorities had 'not made public the risk model and the indicators that 
make up the risk model', or 'any objectively verifiable information to the court to 
enable her to test the State's view of what SyRI is', noting that this less than 
transparent approach was 'a conscious choice by the State…'. The Hague Divisional 
Court was dismissive of the state defence that if there were more transparency over 
the algorithm then citizens could adjust their behaviour accordingly. In terms of the 
detailed issues over transparency shortcomings, the Hague Divisional Court 
observed (at para. 6.90) that: 
it is not possible to check how the simple decision tree, which the State 
speaks about, is created and which steps it consists of. It is thus difficult to 
see how a data subject can defend himself against the fact that a risk report 
has been made with regard to him or her. Likewise, it is difficult to see how a 
data subject whose data has been processed in SyRI but has not led to a risk 
report can be aware that his or her data has been processed on appropriate 
grounds. The fact that in the latter situation the data did not lead to a risk 
notification and, moreover, must have been destroyed no later than four 
weeks after analysis does not detract from the required transparency with 
regard to that processing. 
SyRI had been based on a piece of legislation which was successfully challenged as 
non-compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), and the 
Hague Divisional Court noted (at para 6.54) that  
SyRI law does not provide for an information obligation of those whose data 
are processed in SyRI so that those involved can reasonably be considered to 
know that his or her data is or has been used for that processing. Nor does 
the SyRI legislation provide for an obligation to inform data subjects 
separately, where appropriate, of the fact that a risk report has been made. 
There is only a legal obligation in advance to announce the start of a SyRI 
project by publication in the Government Gazette and afterwards on request 
access to the register of risk reports. The model letter that can be used in 
practice… is not based on a legal obligation to inform those involved 'house to 
house', while the court cannot determine on the basis of the available 
information whether there is a fixed practice [between] municipalities in the 
implementation of the law. Those involved are also not automatically informed 
afterwards. This only happens if there is an audit and investigation in 
response to a risk report. This is not simply done. 
The Hague Divisional Court also picked up on the point that greater transparency in 
relation to predictive modelling of a profiling system is crucial for those who would be 
aware of the need to challenge biases and system unfairness or discrimination in a 
system. As the Court observed (at para. 6.91):  
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The importance of transparency, with a view to controllability, is important in 
part because the use of the risk model and the analysis that is carried out in 
this context involves the risk that (unintentionally) discriminatory effects will 
occur. 
The Hague Divisional Court judgment in the SyRI case, above, is one of the first 
cases brought against state authorities in relation to issues of transparency 
algorithmic profiling, and the first known to be successful in that regard, and on the 
basis of Article 8 ECHR. In the UK, there has been a (so far unsuccessful) challenge 
to the use of live facial recognition in the case of R (Bridges) v South Wales Police 
(2019), and a claim for judicial review, as yet unheard by the High Court, brought by 
the data rights advocacy NGO known as Foxglove, in relation to a visa decision 
algorithm used by the Home Office (McDonald 2019). 
Policing in the UK is prone to complex multi-faceted regulation on any issue, 
with an interplay in policy terms at all times between the Home Office, the National 
Police Chiefs' Council, the College of Policing, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of 
Constabulary, Fire and Rescue Services, the National Crime Agency, and any one, 
through to all, of the nearly 50 regional or specialist police forces in the UK. The UK 
police service has a range of explicit and implicit statutory powers and obligations 
(but not specific statutory basis to use algorithmic or machine learning approaches 
for intelligence analysis) and a range of common law powers around information 
retention, analysis and intelligence sharing. In the UK, the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) increasingly informs police leadership and occupational 
culture, and the training of decision makers in senior operational roles (Poolman et al 
2019). The UK police service should also develop, pilot and deploy AI tech and data 
science expertise, whether in-house or through contractors by following the Defence 
Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Code of Ethics on AI, while there is also a 
draft code for AI procurement published by the UK Office for AI. The Committee on 
Standards in Public Life have had their say in a report on AI and standards in public 
life (2020), discussed below, and there has been a report of a Parliamentary 
Committee on AI technology implications for civil society in the UK (Lords Select 
Committee, 2017). Furthermore, the Information Commissioner's Office has 
published its own consultation on a draft AI auditing framework (2020). The UK 
Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation is also to undertake a public consultation on a 
code of practice for policing in the UK with regard to the use of data analytics and 
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machine learning (Macdonald 2020), following reports from the Royal United 
Services Institute (Babuta and Oswald 2020) on concerns around bias in predictive 
policing and other data-led approaches.  
In the midst of this regulatory complexity, at the time of writing, many forces 
within the UK police service use a self-regulation framework in relation to machine 
learning and data analytics, aimed at police forces that are adopting greater data 
science approaches in their intelligence analysis processes. Known as 'ALGO-
CARE', this regulatory framework is a checklist of key considerations in legal, ethical 
and data science best practice, to be used by police forces in their innovation and 
adoption of capabilities around data analytics and machine learning applications.  
ALGO-CARE requires police forces to use predictive analytics in an advisory 
(not determinative) way, with control over their intellectual property in the algorithm 
concerned, and in a way that is lawful; granular; challengeable; accurate; 
responsible and explainable. The research developing ALGO-CARE was a co-
authored evaluation of the legalities of the 'Harm Assessment Risk Tool' (HART), 
used currently by Durham Constabulary (Oswald & Ors 2018). The HART tool is a 
leading application of machine learning technology as used in intelligence analysis 
and risk management practices by police in the UK. HART was the first such police 
machine learning project in the UK to be open to early academic scrutiny; and as a 
result was the first which has led to the development of a model regulatory 
framework, in the form of ALG-CARE, for algorithmic decision-making in policing.  
The National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) took the decision in November 
2018 to promote the use of ALGO-CARE as a model for best practice in the self-
regulation by UK police forces of their development of machine learning/algorithmic 
tools (Grace 2020). In the summer of 2019, it was confirmed by the NPCC that West 
Midlands Police (WMP) were incorporating the ALGO-CARE checklist or framework 
in internal development processes in relation to new intelligence analysis tools. West 
Midlands Police now host the National Data Analytics Solution (NDAS) for the UK 
police service as a whole. ALGO-CARE is built into the project initiation process for 
NDAS, and has been used to provide ethical oversight for data analytics projects 
concerning identifying risks factors around vulnerability to modern slavery, and the 
perpetration of knife crime (West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner, 2020b). 
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Importantly, Essex Police have also drawn on the ALGO-CARE framework in setting 
up the oversight processes for their data analytics partnership with Essex County 
Council (Essex Centre for Data Analytics 2019). This adoption of self-regulation is 
proof of a respect for the professional ethics in the use of machine learning and data 
analytics in policing. 
However, police force ethics committees might never feel they know enough, 
as outsiders to policing, about exactly what 'interventions' predictive modelling will 
underpin, and whether these will exacerbate inequalities of opportunity, and unequal 
interferences with liberties and rights. For example, in April 2019 the independent 
ethics committee for data analytics for the Office of the Police and Crime 
Commissioner for the West Midlands ('the committee'), of whom the first author is 
vice-Chair, at the time of writing, were asked to consider ethical approval for an 
'Integrated Offender Management' (IOM) data analysis tool. The terms of reference 
of the committee put to the fore their scrutiny of the human rights impacts of 
algorithmic tools, built either by the West Midlands Police (WMP) Data Lab, or the 
National Data Analytics Solution (NDAS), based at WMP. However, a fundamental 
question was even more basic than questions of balancing human rights concerns: 
what was the real purpose, and what would be the estimated impact of the use, of 
the IOM tool? Offender managers are already experienced in risk scoring offenders 
under their supervision, and the minutes of the committee meeting from April 2019 
reveal that the aim of the IOM tool was to allow for a data-driven means of doing this 
in a far more rigorous and reliable way, with the IOM tool forming an advisory 
profiling tool, in time, for those officers 'providing supportive interventions to those 
considered to be at high risk of reoffending and transitioning to higher harm crimes' 
(West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner 2020b), but the committee had 
initial questions about what these interventions might be, not to mention concerns 
about the extent to which the tool, in its development iteration at the time, might be 
'trained' on stale data stretching back many years, or which was riddled with 
disproportionality in relation to stigmatised demographic groups. In time, the WMP 
Data Lab addressed these issues in an informative dialogue with the committee. At 
the time of writing, a pilot of the IOM tool has only just been started in two small 
areas of the area covered by West Midlands Police, and plans are in place to begin 
public engagement over the use of the IOM tool with offender data.  
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The IOM tool is a predictive model, and a running concern of the West 
Midlands committee is the extent to which initially explanatory models developed out 
of large datasets might unintentionally become predictive in the way they might 
influence officers' investigative behaviour. For example, the WMP Data Lab had 
developed an explanatory analysis of rape and serious sexual offences 
investigations ('the RASSO project'). The RASSO project identified that, based on 
fairly recent WMP data, bar the time spent by a lead investigator working on a case, 
the biggest single factor on a rape investigation being progressed versus being 
subject to no further action was the failure to obtain the mobile phone data of rape 
complainants themselves. There are, most understandably, some distinct privacy 
concerns around requiring complainants to hand over their mobile phones for data 
extraction, but the process of disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence to the 
defence is something that is mandated by an Act of Parliament, in the form of the 
provisions of Section 3 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. The 
committee sought assurances and commitments from the force as to how this finding 
would be acted on by WMP before it could advise that the RASSO project could 
progress to its next pilot phase (West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner 
2020b). 
In short, there are a wide range of algorithmic justice techniques, and we 
cannot possible be as comfortable with them all at once, when some of them raise 
more questions for the rights of victims of crime, or when some of them might mean 
more of a risk of stigmatising a community than other tools. 
 
 
[C] RAWLSIAN APPROACHES TO REGULATION: APPLYING 
A THEORY OF JUSTICE TO MACHINE LEARNING IN 
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 
John Rawls used two principles of reasoning to set out and encapsulate his theory of 
justice which might help explore these problems. In 1975, Norman Daniels 
highlighted that the First Principle, 'which has priority over the Second, guarantees a 
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maximal system of equal basic liberties', while the Second Principle 'distributes all 
social goods, other than liberty, allowing inequalities in them provided they benefit 
the least advantaged and provided equality of opportunity is present' (Daniels, 1975: 
xxvii). 
Rawls' first principle 
Rawls' first principle (Rawls 1999: 53) reads: 'Each person is to have an equal right 
to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar 
scheme of liberties for others.'  
As discussed in the introduction, in a real world scenario we might accept that 
not everybody will be subject to AI governance in equal measure or to an equal 
extent. But everybody would like to think that if they were unfairly, in their view, 
profiled by AI then it would be easy to challenge that self-same scoring/ranking/risk 
prediction. The Rawlsian view is that this liberty that should be available to all, 
resulting in an imperative to create accessible avenues to enable challenge, and to 
assist civilians to challenge the decisions of those that use ‘big data’ technologies to 
govern them. 
Holding to account those that govern us requires transparency. It is essential 
that we understand how decisions affecting the most important aspects of our lives 
have been arrived at. Rawls himself wrote (1999: 49) that 'in a well-ordered society, 
one effectively regulated by a shared conception of justice, there is also a public 
understanding as to what is just and unjust.' Much more recently, David 
Spiegelhatler has observed that there is 'increasing demand for accountability of 
algorithms that affect people's lives' (Spiegelhalter 2020: 181), since 'if we do not 
know how an algorithm is producing its answer, we cannot investigate it for implicit 
but systematic biases against some members of the community…' (Spiegelhalter 
2020: 177).  
There is a lack of transparency and understanding of how many algorithmic 
decisions support tools work.  The process by which the calculation is made must be 
accessible to humans and open to challenge. However, many algorithmic systems, 
particularly machines learning tools, produce predicted outcomes without being able 
to show how those predictions have been arrived at. It is this prevalent lack of 
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auditability that led the UK House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence 
to conclude that (2018: 40): 
it is not acceptable to deploy any artificial intelligence system which could 
have a substantial impact on an individual’s life, unless it can generate a full 
and satisfactory explanation for the decisions it will take. 
A failure of proper accountability of algorithmic decision-making to individuals 
threatens the first Rawlsian principle that we all have a set of basic liberties afforded 
to us all. As the use of algorithms to inform critical and sometimes life changing 
decisions becomes more prevalent in our criminal justice system and in other public 
services, the issue of access to justice is fast becoming a problem of access to 
algorithmic justice. 
The General Data Protection Regulation and the Law Enforcement Directive 
(both now part of 'retained EU law' in the UK as a result of the Brexit process) 
provide some safeguards against fully-automated decision-making using machine 
learning, algorithms or AI. Greater signposting is likely to be required, however, 
where these technologies are used in government in fully-automated ways. There is 
then the crucial issue of the increasingly large degree to which decisions by public 
bodies - about policy, but often about individuals in particular personal 
circumstances, are algorithmically-informed decisions. Here, both greater statutory 
clarity as to rights of challenge, and greater safeguards involving transparency are 
required. Challenge requires transparency. Transparency is severely limited in what 
it can achieve if there are no mechanisms for challenge. 
Rawls' second principle 
Rawls' second principle (Rawls 1999: 53) demands that: 'Social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to 
everyone's advantage and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.' This 
second principle translates into an imperative that 'big data' technologies used to 
assist decision-making must be used in such a way that they do not re-entrench 
inequality in power, wealth, income and other resources i.e. that they work to the 
overall benefit of the worst-off members of society. 
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Rawls' notion that 'social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that 
they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged' is termed his 'difference 
principle'. Duff (2006: 21) explains that:  
The difference principle … is regarded as Rawls’s special contribution to the 
repertoire of principles of distributive justice in the western tradition. Its genius 
lies in its balancing of two powerful moral intuitions: that equal shares are fair, 
at least as an initial benchmark; but also that inequalities can be acceptable if 
the incentives they allow lead to a greater total cake, thus benefiting 
everyone, including the worst off. For who wants an equality of misery? 
 
Our moral intuition, to use Duff's phrase, concerning the difference principle in the 
context of algorithmic justice, is that AI and machine learning can be based on 
'training data' which is either known or suspected to be biased, as long as this is a) 
acknowledged and mitigated when the AI or machine learning tool is developed, and 
b) such a tool is meaningfully used to redress inequalities, not re-embed them, lest 
there be an inherent unlawfulness in its use. In essence, the stated and true purpose 
of algorithmic justice must be more equal justice, or algorithmic justice must be 
avoided altogether. This approach to applying the difference principle to matters of 
algorithmic justice would need to be based in primary legislation, in a development of 
something like the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) which already exists in the 
UK under the provisions of the Equality Act 2010. 
Using the PSED and protected characteristics as a Rawlsian structuring tool 
The PSED is a statutory requirement to be 'properly informed', of the equality 
implications of decisions made in the course of carrying out public functions, 
following Elias LJ in R (Hurley and Moore) v Secretary of State for Business, 
Innovation and Skills [2012] EWHC 201 (Admin), at 89. There are equality 
implications in relation to the impact on protected characteristics, including age, 
disability, and so forth2. Section 149 Equality Act 2010 provides that: 
(1) A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to 
the need to— 
(a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other 
conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act; 
                                            
2
 'Protected characteristics': S.149 (7) EA 2010: 'age; disability; gender reassignment; pregnancy and 
maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation'... 
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(b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a 
relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it; 
(c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant 
protected characteristic and persons who do not share it. 
The PSED has required a degree of proactivity and culture change in the work of 
government bodies in the UK, as well as a clear commitment to gather information 
and to undertake consultation that would inform their work on preventing 
discrimination. In the words of Lord Boyd, in the recent case of R (McHattie) v South 
Ayrshire Council (2020: 31): 'The duties in the Equality Act 2010 and specifically 
section 149 are not simply about the prevention of discrimination but the promotion 
of policies which will help eliminate differences between the protected group and 
those who do not share that protection.' 
The Metropolitan Police have published a document (Metropolitan Police 
Service 2020) that sets out what they term their legal mandated for Live Facial 
Recognition (LFR), and this acknowledges the need for compliance with the PSED in 
deploying the controversial technology in public spaces, but has few details as to 
how decision-makers in this regard would ensure they were 'properly informed' about 
the equality issues inherent in deploying LFR in various areas of London with a 
differing prevalence of people of different ethnicities, for example - when there is a 
consistent and important concern about poorer accuracy rates for facial recognition 
technology with regard to the real-time identification of non-white persons (Harwell 
2019). 
The Met have an interesting pair of issues in their own recently published 
guidance document on live facial recognition technology (as opposed to their 
purported 'legal mandate' document). First they seem to make a policy commitment 
to public notification prior to deployments; second they committed to only deploy the 
technology overtly. These are two commitments to be applauded, from the 
perspective of Rawls' first principle concerning an equality of liberties for all. But the 
Met say their watch lists of suspect photographs used in the deployment of LFR are 
not marked with data about ethnicity, meaning that accuracy rates for 'hits' or 'flags' 
in each LFR will be harder to determine.  This seems to undermine PSED 
compliance, in either the spirit or the letter of the law. The Met claim it is because 
they should only process ethnicity data when strictly necessary for policing purposes, 
14 
 
and that this is not a strictly necessary purpose under the terms of Part 3 of the Data 
Protection Act 2018. But this disregards the self-monitoring the PSED requires. The 
PSED is a statutory duty, just as the requirement for minimal data processing under 
the Data Protection Act 2018 is a statutory duty. Perhaps in an evaluation of LFR 
deployments, 'hits' or matches by ethnicity can be added back in to the watch list 
data - but if this is the case, the Met’s claim that they need to remove ethnicity data 
from watch lists seems pointless. Efforts to engage with the public over LFR must be 
more genuine than this sort of dry, data protection-driven detailing in response to 
valid concerns (Yesburg & Ors 2020). 
The operational guidance from the Met concerning LFR would be more 
reassuring for public confidence on the issue of bias if there was a clearer 
commitment and explanation as to the overall purpose of the use of LFR by the 
police in London in meeting their duties under the PSED, and actually reducing bias 
in street-level policing over time. The force falsely claimed in an equalities impact 
assessment that the use of the technology was supported by the UK Biometrics 
Commissioner under current governance arrangement, risking public confidence in 
the integrity of their use of LFR (Gayle 2020). 
The Information Commissioner's Office picked up on a key issue of 
intersectionality - in this case an increased impact on the protected race and age, 
and a likely breach of the PSED - when it issued an Enforcement Notice under the 
Data Protection Act in relation to the Gangs Matrix operated by the Metropolitan 
Police (ICO 2018a). The Gangs Matrix had not been used in a way that was 
sufficiently transparent or open to challenge by the disproportionately young black 
men and teenage males that it 'scored' for gang connections in the London area 
(MOPAC 2018). The ICO has produced a checklist for compliance for police forces 
using gang intelligence databases (ICO 2018b) but arguably the best confirmation of 
the impact of greater scrutiny arising from the Enforcement Notice against this 
algorithmic (in)justice came when the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime 
(MOPAC) in London purported to overhaul the workings of the Gangs Matrix 
(MOPAC 2020). 
Gangs of any type can be statistically modelled as networks with a numbers 
of nodes representing suspects (or 'nominals', in police intelligence parlance), 
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victims and witnesses to reported crimes. The WMP Data Lab plan to use the 
measure of 'network centrality' when building algorithmic models that explain the 
links between organised crime groups and the individuals that make them up - a tool 
to be used to better target police operations and investigations aimed at disrupting 
serious organised crime (West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner 
2020c).The problem with using 'network centrality' in predictive or explanatory 
modelling is the potential for bias when this 'centrality' is calculated from police 
intelligence.  
The data from police intelligence is always going to be subjective and prone to 
human bias, especially when a 'network' is partly or wholly a proxy for, or situated 
within, a demographic group affected by societal inequalities. Humans all behave 
according to 'assortativity', a tendency to be aligned with or attracted to people who 
are like ourselves3. This is a great underlying influence on calculating an individual's 
'eigenvector centrality' - or influence in a network (University of Chieti-Pescara, 2020 
online). So if society does not allow for much mobility and is not really progressive, 
the disadvantaged will form denser 'network nodes' (read: closer human 
relationships) with other disadvantaged people.  
Issues around the uneven spread of poverty in society, on a geographical 
basis, is a real problem for the use of analytics from the perspective of Rawls' 
Second Principle. When the WMP Data Lab seek to use postcode data linked to 
individuals ('nominals') as a reasonable proxy, even though they acknowledge this is 
not ideal, we see an example of the police building an explanatory model using an 
analytical approach they know to be biased against individuals who reside in poorer 
areas of cities or towns (West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner 2020d). It 
must be acknowledged that this model is statistically valid as a matter of data 
science. It is an explanatory model which is not designed to make predictions about 
individuals and target interventions, though it is built from masses of data about 
many individual cases. However, the data science considerations are separate from 
the questions this model raises for in relation to its implications for operational 
policing and thus Rawls’ philosophy.  
                                            
3
 For an overview of assortativity and other network theory principles please see Niall Ferguson, The 




A worrying concern, is how this explanatory model, when used in relation to 
young people at risk of being drawn into serious violence, will be interpreted by 
officers. There is a potential that it is misapplied by officers who allow the results of 
the 'Youth MSV' project to confirm their own assumptions about the affluence or 
poverty in the places where people live, and the effect this relative deprivation has 
on them. For this reason, it is to be welcomed that the independent ethics oversight 
committee for WMP have required that public consultation over the use of the 
'Integrated Offender Management' (IOM) tool in development by the Data Lab at the 
force be augmented by a qualitative evaluation of how the piloting of the tool saw 
changes in the way that officers worked with offenders and how this related to their 
decisions on 'interventions' (West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner 2020b). 
As Couldechova and Roth have observed (2018: 5), when 'dealing with socio-
technical systems, it is also important to understand how algorithms dynamically 
effect their environment, and the incentives of human actors.' 
The impact of the PSED, and the Equality Act 2010, on the regulation of the 
use of algorithmic governance would be extended even further, in order to meet 
Rawls' Second Principle, if S.1 of the Equality Act 2010 were brought into effect. 
Current enacted but not in force in England and Wales, this provision of the 2010 Act 
would require police forces, and many other public bodies, to have 'due regard' to 
the need for decisions 'designed to reduce the inequalities of outcome which result 
from socio-economic disadvantage'. However, as currently enacted this 'due regard' 
duty for socio-economic disadvantage would apply only to 'strategic decisions' as 
opposed to all the 'public functions' of a force. A natural step, and one in line with 
Rawls' Second Principle, would be to make 'relative poverty' or 'low income' a 
protected characteristic under S.149(7) of the 2010 Act. 
 
 
[D] DISCUSSION: HOW CAN WE INCORPORATE RAWLS 
INTO THE USE OF AI IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS?  
Increasingly algorithms play a vital role in our lives. In relation to the use of big data 
technologies in our public institutions there are many areas which require effective 
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oversight and clearer laws and guidance in order to conform to Rawls’ philosophy. 
The need for greater transparency and accountability is highlighted in a recent report 
on the use of Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System produced by the Law 
Society, along with issues of privacy, fairness and equality (Law Society 2020). 
In the recent case of Gaughran v UK (2020), the European Court of Human 
Rights made an interesting comment on Article 8 ECHR and technology, noting (86):  
the importance of examining compliance with the principles of Article 8 where 
the powers vested in the state are obscure, creating a risk of arbitrariness 
especially where the technology available is continually becoming more 
sophisticated. 
Are the powers of UK police forces to use algorithmic technologies obscure, creating 
that risk of arbitrary use of continually more sophisticated machine learning or AI? 
The Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL), in their report on Artificial 
Intelligence and Public Standards, published in February 2020, made as one of its 
key recommendations the creation of a duty on public bodies to clearly articulate 
their legal basis for the use of algorithmically-informed governance, arguing (CSPL 
2020: 40) that: 'All public sector organisations should publish a statement on how 
their use of AI complies with relevant laws and regulations before they are deployed 
in public service delivery. ' This degree of transparency would be admirable, as it 
would entail the creation of a statutory duty through a new act of Parliament to apply 
to law enforcement agencies and bodies, and public bodies more broadly, alike. The 
CSPL also concluded that on 'AI' including the use of machine learning for predictive 
policing and for live facial recognition, the current 'regulatory framework is not yet fit 
for purpose' (CSPL 2020: 40). 
Another report in February 2020, by the Royal United Services Institute for the 
Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (Babuta and Oswald 2020: ix), recommended 
that for UK police forces 'investing in new data analytics software as a full 
operational capability, an integrated impact assessment should be conducted, to 
establish a clear legal basis and operational guidelines for use of the tool'. Babuta 
and Oswald argued for a range of requirements to be placed on UK police forces 
adopting algorithmic justice approaches and practices, recommending the mandated 
'integrated impact assessment'. Their RUSI report calls, overall, for the use of 
combined data protection impact assessments, equality impact assessments, human 
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rights impact assessments (with a particular focus on positive obligations in relation 
to protection of the right to life, and protecting individuals from serious violence or 
abuse), assessments of expected levels of errors in any predictions made by an 
algorithmic model, and a requirement for independent ethical oversight mechanisms 
for data analytics or AI projects in police forces (Babuta and Oswald 2020).  
With regard to the notion of ethical oversight as valuable, some academic critics 
have reminded us of the need to maintain the necessary focus on legal reform so as 
to not drift into using more flexible and ultimately non-binding ethical standards for 
regulating algorithmic justice. Black and Murray (2020: 7), for example, explain that: 
The wider discourse that is taking place is drawing us away from law, or even 
traditional models of command and control or co-regulation and governance, 
towards soft self-regulation and codes of practice. This ethical model … has seen 
the adoption of codes of practice for general AI and for data-driven health and 
care technology, among others. However r… ethical standards for such systemic 
risks are insufficient.  
 
[E] CONCLUSIONS 
To begin our conclusions on an optimistic point, we would agree with Ori Gilboa 
(2019 online), who has suggested that: 'AI provides us with the unprecedented 
opportunity to transform our society into one that is more just.' And while it is 
important to note, as Kalle Eriksson does, that with regard to increasingly algorithmic 
governance, the approach of '… ‘business as usual’ is bound to move us towards 
increased inequalities and decreased possibilities for most individuals to pursue their 
conception of the good life,' we also agree with Eriksson that 'there are reasons for 
hopefulness, since we have also seen that this development could be reversed by 
making the social choice to own and administer the technology jointly' (Eriksson 
2018: 40). 
Machines like humans can be flawed. However, it can be easier to identify 
their flaws and correct for them. While artificial intelligence systems today are often 
opaque and poorly understood if they can be unpacked to show how the output was 
reached, as is possible in the HART model, algorithms can increase auditability. This 
is not the same for a solely human decision-making process which is always going to 
be opaque to some extent. If people exercise judgement with access to auditable 
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information provided by an algorithm this could increase transparency, accountability 
and correct for human bias.  
Civil society is certainly beginning to add momentum toward stricter regulation 
of algorithmic justice matters. After consulting widely, the UK national human rights 
body, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) has submitted (EHRC 
2020: 66) to a UN Committee that it has concerns about algorithmic governance in 
the UK today. The EHRC submitted that: 'predictive policing replicates and magnifies 
patterns of discrimination in policing, while lending legitimacy to biased processes. A 
reliance on ‘big data’ encompassing large amounts of personal information may also 
infringe upon privacy rights and result in self-censorship, with a consequent chilling 
effect on freedom of expression and association.' The EHRC would also 'suspend 
the use of automated facial recognition and predictive programmes in policing, 
pending completion of the… independent impact assessments and [a public and 
parliamentary] consultation process, and the adoption of appropriate mitigating 
action.' (EHRC 2020: 89) 
 
Zuiderveen Borgesius goes a logical step further, arguing for new legislation 
aimed at tackling new unfairnesses affecting 'newly invented classes', amongst 
those subjected to bias in algorithmic governance, explaining that 
Non-discrimination law and data protection law are the most relevant legal 
instruments to fight illegal discrimination by algorithmic systems… But some 
types of algorithmic decisions evade current laws, while they can lead to 
unfair differentiation or discrimination. For instance, many non-discrimination 
statutes only apply to discrimination on the basis of certain protected grounds, 
such as ethnic origin. Such statutes do not apply if organisations differentiate 
on the basis of newly invented classes that do not correlate with protected 
grounds. Such differentiation could still be unfair, however, for instance when 
it reinforces social inequality. We probably need additional regulation to 
protect fairness and human rights in the area of algorithmic decision-making 
(Zuiderveen Borgesius 2020: 15). 
 
In relation to the PSED, the Law Society has recommended (2020: 7) that with 
respect to the growing use of algorithmic governance in the criminal justice system, 
and the 'importance of countering discrimination within algorithmic systems, Equality 
Impact Assessments should be formalised as a requirement before deploying any 
consequential algorithmic system in the public sector and these should be made 
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proactively, publicly available.' The Law Society also recommended (2020: 7) that 
given 'algorithmic systems’ high potential for socioeconomic discrimination, the 
Government should commence the socioeconomic equality duty in the Equality Act 
2010 s1 in England and Wales, at least with regard to algorithmic decision-support 
systems.' 
Our overall conclusion is that in order to gain maximum value and help for the 
vulnerable, and in doing so by applying Rawlsian thinking to the regulation of 
algorithmic governance in the UK, there needs to be a political commitment to a 
rolling programme of sector-by-sector legal reform, in order to legislate more deeply 
for a culture of algorithmic justice. As Zuiderveen Borgesius has also concluded 
(2020: 15), 
it is probably not useful to adopt rules for algorithmic decision-making in 
general. Just like we did not, and could not, adopt one statute to regulate the 
industrial revolution, we cannot adopt one statute to regulate algorithmic 
decision-making. To mitigate problems caused by the industrial revolution, we 
needed different laws for work safety, consumer protection, the environment, 
etc. In different sectors, the risks are different, and different norms and values 
are at stake. Therefore, new rules for algorithmic decision-making should be 
sector-specific. 
 
Mechanisms for oversight such as ethics committees and regulators need to be 
bolstered by the law. At the time of writing, in April 2020, the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe have just published a set of Recommendations concerning 
'human rights impacts of algorithmic systems' (Council of Europe, 2020a), 'calling on 
governments to ensure that they do not breach human rights through their own use, 
development or procurement of algorithmic systems', and explaining that, '…as 
regulators, [governments] should establish effective and predictable legislative, 
regulatory and supervisory frameworks that prevent, detect, prohibit and remedy 
human rights violations, whether stemming from public or private actors' (Council of 
Europe, 2020b). The preamble of the recent Recommendation demands that 'the 
rule of law standards that govern public and private relations, such as legality, 
transparency, predictability, accountability and oversight, must also be maintained in 
the context of algorithmic systems' (Council of Europe 2020a). This of course 
accords with Rawls' First Principle. The Recommendation also follows the notion of 
Rawls' Second Principle, purporting to mandate that Member States of the Council of 
Europe, like the UK, put data bias, and equality concerns to the fore in developing 
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legal standards in relation to algorithmic systems used in government. The 
Recommendation sets out how: 
In the design, development, ongoing deployment and procurement of 
algorithmic systems for or by them, States should carefully assess what 
human rights and non-discrimination rules may be affected as a result of the 
quality of data that are being put into and extracted from an algorithmic 
system, as these often contain bias and may stand in as a proxy for classifiers 
such as gender, race, religion, political opinion or social origin. The 
provenance and possible shortcomings of the dataset, the possibility of its 
inappropriate or decontextualised use, the negative externalities resulting 
from these shortcomings and inappropriate uses as well as the environments 
within which the dataset will be or could possibly be used, should also be 
assessed carefully (Council of Europe 2020a). 
 
In summary, it remains to be seen how the UK government will choose to 
combine data protection, equality law approaches and human rights standards in 
developing new legislation to meet emerging challenges of algorithmic justice in 
data-driven governance. In our view, laws and guidance for the use of artificial 
intelligence in our criminal justice system and in other public institutes must ensure 
that the data, the technology and the process by which the technology is used reflect 
Rawls’ principles. A Theory of Justice provides a blueprint for our democracy and it 
remains highly relevant today as we grapple with the ethics and regulation of 'big 
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